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Abstract
Increased activity of multinational rms exposes national corporate tax bases to cross-
country prot shifting, but also leads to rising protability of the corporate sector. We
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model where the median voter decides on a redistributive income tax rate. In this
setting economic integration may raise or lower the equilibrium tax rate, and it is more
likely to raise the tax rate of a low-tax country. The implications of the model are
consistent with the empirical observations that e¤ective corporate tax rates have not
fallen in all OECD countries, and that corporate tax revenues have generally risen.
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1 Introduction
One of the most pronounced trends in the world economy over the last decades has been
the rise in foreign direct investment and multinational activity. In the United States,
for example, foreign prots made up around 5 per cent of all corporate prots earned
by U.S. rms until the late 1960s, but this share has meanwhile risen to more than 25
per cent, and is probably even higher (Desai and Hines, 2004). As a consequence of this
development national corporate tax bases have become more sensitive to tax changes.2
Most of the literature on international tax competition has therefore modelled economic
integration as a pure increase in the mobility of the capital tax base. In these models
the typical result is that increasing capital mobility leads governments to undercut each
others capital income tax rates, resulting in underprovision of public goods as well as
relatively higher taxes on immobile factors (see Wilson, 1999 for a survey).
Empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction is mixed, however. Table 1
summarizes the development of corporate tax rates and tax revenues in a representative
sample of OECD countries. Two stylized facts stand out. First, statutory corporate tax
rates have been signicantly reduced in most OECD countries since the 1980s, but tax
bases have simultaneously been broadened. As a consequence, e¤ective tax rates on
prots have fallen by much less than statutory rates, and in several countries they have
not fallen at all.3 Second, an even more signicant deviation from the standard theory
of tax competition arises with respect to the development of tax revenue as a share
of GDP. Corporate tax revenue has increased signicantly in most countries since the
early 1980s, despite the average fall in e¤ective tax rates.4
The present short paper proposes a simple model to reconcile the theory of tax com-
2This tax sensitivity may arise either from the location and investment decisions of multinational
rms, or from prot-shifting activities. The empirical evidence on the e¤ects of taxes on rm location
and prot-shifting is surveyed in Hines (1999) and, more recently, Devereux (2006).
3The measures shown in Table 1 are the e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the e¤ective
average tax rate (EATR). The EATR can be seen as a weighted average of the statutory tax rate and
the EMTR, where the latter is the tax rate on an investment that just earns a net rate of return equal
to the going interest rate. The weight of the statutory tax rate in the EATR rises with the protability
that is assumed for the underlying investment project. For a description of these measures and further
details on the development of corporate taxation since the 1980s, see Devereux et al. (2002).
4The di¤erent time trends for di¤erent measures of corporate taxation also seem to be the main
source of diverging results in the econometric literature that tests the relationship between economic
integration and the level of corporate taxation. This relationship is typically negative if the latter
is measured by statutory or e¤ective average tax rates, but the negative sign disappears when tax
revenue is the dependent variable. See Rodrik (1997), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Swank and
Steinmo (2002), Slemrod (2004) and Winner (2005).
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Table 1: Corporate income taxation (CIT) in OECD countries
statutory e¤ective mar- e¤ective ave- CIT revenue
tax ratea ginal tax rateb rage tax ratec (% of GDP)
Country 1982 2005 1982 2005 1982 2005 1982 2004
Australia 50 30 32 24 37 26 2.7 5.7
Austria 61 25 25 20 37 22 1.2 2.3
Belgium 45 34 31 22 35 26 2.2 3.6
Canada 45 36 9 25 25 28 2.7 3.4
Finland 60 26 43 17 45 21 1.6 3.6
France 50 34 26 20 34 25 2.1 2.8
Germany 62 38 47 29 48 32 1.9 1.6
Greece 43 32 33 12 36 21 0.9 3.3
Ireland 10 13 0 10 5 11 1.5 3.6
Italy 39 37 18 19 26 26 2.9 2.8
Japan 55 40 42 28 44 32 5.2 3.8
Netherlands 48 32 35 21 38 25 2.8 3.1
Norway 51 28 34 22 38 24 6.8 10.0
Spain 33 35 23 21 26 26 1.2 3.4
Sweden 60 28 43 16 45 21 1.5 3.2
Switzerland 35 34 21 21 26 25 1.7 2.5
United Kingdom 52 30 0 20 26 24 3.7 2.9
United States 50 39 22 24 32 29 2.0 2.2
OECD average 47.2 31.7 26.9 20.6 33.5 24.7 2.5 3.5
a Including typical local income taxes and supplementary charges. In countries with more
than one tax rate, the manufacturing rate was chosen.
b Investment in plant or machinery, nanced by equity or retained earnings. Taxation at
shareholder level not included. Real discount rate 10%, ination rate 3.5%, depreciation rate
12.2%.
c Rate of economic rent: 10% (i.e. nancial return 20%). Further assumptions as in b.
Sources: - IFS tax data (www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210);
- OECD (2006): Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-2005, Table 12
(http://www.sourceoecd.org/rpsv/cw/vhosts/oecdthemes/99980169/v2006n7/contp1-
1.htm)
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petition with these empirical observations. Our central argument is that economic
integration a¤ects not only the mobility of the corporate tax base, but it simultane-
ously increases its size through a higher protability of incorporated rms.5 These twin
e¤ects of economic integration are embedded into a stylized political economy model.
The simplicity of our framework allows us to derive reduced-form expressions for the
optimal redistributive tax rates chosen by the median voter. In this model economic
integration increases both the redistributive gains, but also the e¢ ciency costs of tax-
ation from the perspective of the median voter. Hence globalization may raise or lower
the redistributive tax rate in the political economy equilibrium. Furthermore, we show
that tax revenue may rise in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, even if the equilibrium
tax rate is reduced.
Our argument that economic integration increases the protability of rms is based,
in particular, on the development of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Empirical ev-
idence from the international trade literature shows that multinational rms are on
average more productive than local rms (see e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables,
2004). This di¤erence in productivity and protability can be explained, for example,
by the ability of MNEs to utilize di¤erences in international factor prices (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985). Productivity growth and rising prots will thus arise at the indus-
try level when economic integration reallocates market shares from domestic to more
productive multinational rms (Melitz, 2003). Recent empirical evidence for the U.S.
manufacturing industry shows that economic integration leads to productivity growth
both at the rm and at the industry level (Bernard et al., 2006). Similar evidence is
obtained for the United Kingdom, where the shift towards the service sector, and in
particular towards the highly protable banking, nance and insurance branches is one
of the factors explaining the rise in corporate tax revenues over the last two decades
(Devereux et al., 2004). With few exceptions, however, these developments have not
yet been incorporated in the international tax literature.6
5Another argument why corporate tax bases may have increased is that a rising share of rms
has chosen an organizational form that subjects them to corporate rather than personal income tax.
We do not further pursue this argument here, but acknowledge that it plays a complementary role in
explaining the increase in corporate tax bases. See Sørensen (2007, sec. 2.2) for further discussion.
6A partial exception are models of industry agglomeration where economic integration will, for some
range of transports costs, increase the agglomeration rents that rms can earn in the core country
and hence increase this countrys taxing power (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck
and Püger, 2006). However, in these models the increase in protability in response to economic
integration is limited to rms located in core countries, and it occurs only for a limited range of trade
costs. A di¤erent approach to explain ambiguous tax responses to economic integration is pursued by
Fuest (2005). In his model economic integration raises the share of foreign rm ownership and thus
strengthens the incentive to tax the prots accruing to foreigners. However, this last e¤ect can only
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The basic model that underlies our analysis is presented in section 2. Section 3 analyzes
the e¤ects of economic integration on the redistributive tax rate and tax revenues in
the Nash equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of two countries, denoted by subscript i 2 f1; 2g, which are popu-
lated by two types of individuals, capitalists (superscript C) and workers (superscript
L). The two countries are identical, except for the share of workers and capitalists in
the overall population. To minimize notation, we assume that each worker exogenously
supplies one unit of labour and consumes an aggregate consumption good whose price
is normalized to one. In each country i it takes one unit of domestic labour to pro-
duce one unit of the numeraire good. Competitive market conditions then determine
that the wage rate equals one and each worker receives a gross wage income of unity,
whereas the representative capitalists prot income is zero when domestic labour is
employed. However, each capitalist can set up a MNE and earn positive prots  when
a MNE headquartered in country i sets up a subsidiary in the other country j (j 6= i).
In this case it takes only w  1 units of the other countrys labor to produce one unit
of output. In a highly stylized way, this set-up captures either idiosyncratic e¢ ciency
gains accruing from a multinational structure, or a (symmetric) advantage for each
country to obtain lower factor prices abroad.
Each country levies a proportional, comprehensive income tax at rate ti on all wage
and prot income. The labour tax base is internationally immobile, whereas the prot
tax base is responsive to tax di¤erentials between the two countries. Hence capitalists
in each country face two decisions: they choose (i) how much to produce abroad and
(ii) how much prot to shift between the two countries. Both of these decisions have
been extensively discussed in the literature. We incorporate them here in a way that
keeps our argument as simple as possible.7
We rst turn to the decision of how much output each MNE residing in country i
produces in the foreign country j. While foreign labour input is cheaper in e¢ ciency
dominate the role of increased tax base mobility, if the government can also use import tari¤s.
7Hauer et al. (2006) also consider the determination of income taxes in the presence of multi-
national rms. In their analysis, however, only the prot-shifting decision of the MNE is modelled.
Hence, as in much of the tax literature, gains from globalisation are absent and the feedback e¤ects
of increased corporate protability on tax policy, which are central to the analysis here, do not arise.
Instead the focus of their analysis is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the e¤ects that
di¤erent country-specic variables have on the mix of wage and prot taxes in small open economies.
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units, producing abroad adds extra transaction costs that must be given a wide in-
terpretation (i.e, they apply to costs related to adopting to a new cultural and legal
environment, information and monitoring costs etc.). We model these costs as being
convex in the volume of foreign production reecting, for example, increasing marginal
monitoring costs when larger parts of production are outsourced.8 For simplicity we
specify quadratic costs of the form  = x2i =(2), where xi is the volume of rm is
production abroad and 1= is the cost parameter. We interpret the inverse of the cost
parameter, , as a measure of economic integration. Increasing economic integration
(a rise in ) will reduce the transaction costs for foreign direct investment. With these
specications the before-tax prots of each rm, which equal the gross prots of capi-
talists in both countries, are given by
i = xi(1  w)  x
2
i
2
8 i: (1)
The second decision of capitalists concerns the distribution of gross prots for tax
purposes. We assume that the residence principle is legally in place so that prots are
taxed in the country where the rm is headquartered. However, a MNE headquartered
in country i may be able to shift some of the prots earned to country j, either through
transfer pricing or by using tax-e¢ cient nancing structures.9 Let  be the share of
prots that is transferred to country j in this way. As in the case of the rms production
decisions it is costly to engage in prot shifting activities and the deadweight costs
are convex in the amount of prots transferred abroad. Hence, by analogy to the
transaction costs incurred when rms produce abroad, the real resources spent when
transferring prots are " = 2=(2). Assuming further that the transaction costs 
are tax-deductible in both countries, the after-tax income of each capitalist, yCi , is thus
yCi = i

(1  i)(1  ti) + i(1  tj) 
2i
2

8i; j; i 6= j; (2)
where i is given in (1).
It is seen from equation (2) that for each rm the output decision (xi) is separated
from the decision on prot shifting (i).
10 From (1) each MNE in country i maximizes
8This is in line with some of the ndings in the new theory of the multinational rm (see Marin
and Verdier, 2003).
9Income can be shifted through borrowing and lending between the multinationals a¢ liates, be-
cause the interest paid on this internal loan is taxable in the lending country, but tax-deductible in
the borrowing country. See Mintz and Smart (2004) for a detailed modelling of this tax avoidance
mechanism.
10This results from the specication of the transaction cost functions  and ". With more general
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its gross prots by choosing
xi =  (1  w)  w ; (3)
where we have introduced w as a short-hand notation for the exogenous cost advan-
tage of producing one unit of output abroad.
Substituting (3) in (1) yields the maximized gross prots of each rm
1 = 

2 =

2
(w)2  : (4)
From (3) and (4) the level of output produced abroad and maximized gross prots
for each MNE are a rising function of the unit wage di¤erential and of the degree of
economic integration. Moreover maximized gross prots for each capitalist will be the
same in countries 1 and 2, due to the symmetry assumptions made with respect to
production.
To maximize net prots the optimal level of i is derived from (2). This yields
i =  (ti   tj) 8i; j; i 6= j: (5)
It thus follows from (4) and (5) that economic integration (a rise in ) will raise the
gross prots of each rm, but at the same time it increases the share of prots that is
shifted for any given international tax di¤erential.
3 Tax equilibrium and economic integration
In each country i 2 f1; 2g, the total population is normalized to unity and consists of
i workers and (1   i) capitalists. The share of workers i is allowed to di¤er in the
two countries. However, workers form the majority of the population in both countries
(1 > i > 0:5 8 i) and tax policy in each country is determined by the median voter.
In line with the basic theory of optimal income taxation, we assume that overall tax
revenue is redistributed, in equal per-capita terms, to the entire population. Hence we
can simply maximize the after-tax income of the representative worker in each country.
This is given by yLi = (1   ti) + Ri, where the gross wage income is unity and Ri are
per-capita tax collections.11
specications, the output and prot shifting decisions will interact. Modelling this interaction would,
however, signicantly complicate the analysis without qualitatively changing our main results. The
separation of output and prot-shifting decisions is a common assumption in the literature; see the
survey by Gresik (2001).
11The latter equal total tax collections by our normalization of population size. Note that a well-
dened optimal tax rate is obtained in our model, despite the linearity of the objective function,
because the excess burden of taxation is strictly convex in the tax rate.
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The tax base in country i is wage income plus the shares of prot income from all
rms that are reported in country i. Using the optimal tax avoidance decision of each
capitalist [eq. (5)], total and per capita tax revenues in country i are
Ri = ti
8<:i +
(1)z }| {
(1  i) [1   (ti   tj)] +
(2)z }| {
(1  j)(tj   ti)
9=; 8 i; j; i 6= j: (6)
In this expression, the overbraced term (1) denotes the prots of the MNEs headquar-
tered in country i that are reported in their country of residence whereas term (2) gives
the prots of country js MNEs that are shifted to country i.
Using (6), the after-tax income of the representative worker in country i is
yLi = (1  ti) + ti

i + (1  i)   (ti   tj)

(1  i) + (1  j)
	 8 i; j; i 6= j:
(7)
The equilibrium policy maximizes yLi with respect to the proportional income tax ti.
This yields the best response functions
ti(tj) =
(1  i)(   1) + tj

(1  i) + (1  j)

2

(1  i) + (1  j)
 8 i; j; i 6= j: (8)
Hence best responses are upward-sloping in both countries. Moreover, in the simple
model used here, tax rates in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium can be calculated in
explicit form:
ti =
(   1) 2 (1  i) + (1  j)
3

(1  i) + (1  j)
 8 i; j; i 6= j; (9)
where  is given in (4). Note rst that a necessary condition for the redistributive tax
rates to be positive in both countries is that the gross prots earned by each capitalist
exceed the gross wage (normalized to one) of the representative worker in each region.
This will be assumed in what follows. Equation (9) further shows that the country with
the higher share of workers will levy the lower redistributive tax rate. For concreteness
assume 1 > 2 so that country 1 chooses a lower tax rate than country 2. The reason is
that there are fewer capitalists and hence lower aggregate prots (1 ) in country 1
so that equality between the redistributive gains from the tax and the convex e¢ ciency
losses is reached at a lower tax rate. Finally, if the countries are symmetric, equation (9)
immediately reduces to t1 = t

2 = (
   1)=(2) > 0.
The core issue underlying our analysis is whether economic integration, as described
by an increase in , leads to a rise or a fall in the Nash equilibrium tax rates. Di¤er-
entiating (9) with respect to , using d=d = (w)2=2 from (4) and resubstituting
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the tax rate in (9) yields
dti
d
=  ti

+
[2(1  i) + (1  j)](w)2
6()2

(1  i) + (1  j)
 8 i; j; i 6= j: (10)
Equation (10) shows two counteracting e¤ects of economic integration. The rst term
captures the increased e¢ ciency costs of redistributive taxation when economic inte-
gration makes the domestic prot tax base more mobile internationally and increases
international prot-shifting. This e¤ect is unambiguously negative, if the equilibrium
tax rate (9) is positive. The second e¤ect describes the additional redistributive gains
from the income tax when economic integration raises the prots of multinational rms
and hence capitalists in both countries. Both the negative rst e¤ect and the positive
second e¤ect are larger in the high-tax country 2 (which has the larger number of cap-
italists). Depending on which of the two e¤ects dominates, economic integration may
thus either raise or lower the redistributive tax rate chosen by the median voter.12 We
summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Economic integration tends to increase (decrease) the redistributive
income tax rate, if (i) the equilibrium tax rate is small (large) in the initial equilibrium
and (ii) if the cost advantage of producing one unit of output abroad is large (small).
Given the empirical evidence in Table 1 that overall corporate tax rates have been
falling, the negative rst e¤ect in equation (10) seems to be dominating, on average.
From Proposition 1 we should then expect to observe a less pronounced trend towards
falling tax rates in the countries that have low taxes initially. A comparison with the
country data collected in Table 1 shows that there is indeed support for this hypothesis.
Those countries which lowered their e¤ective average tax rates only marginally or
not at all during the period 1982-2005 (Canada, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland,
United Kingdom), were also the ones that started out with tax rates below the sample
average. In contrast the countries with the highest statutory tax rates in 1982 (Austria,
Germany and Sweden) all enacted severe cuts in statutory and e¤ective tax rates. This
convergence of tax rates in response to economic integration is consistent with the
results of our model.
12Note the di¤erence between our results and those derived in political economy models of strategic
delegation (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Gottschalk and Peters, 2003). In these models the working
majority is able to mitigate the downward pressure on capital tax rates by delegating decisions to
politicians that prefer a larger degree of redistribution than the median voter herself. Nevertheless,
the only direct e¤ect of economic integration is increased tax base mobility. As a consequence economic
integration leads, in equilibrium, to an unambiguous decline in the level of redistributive taxation.
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Finally we evaluate the e¤ects of economic integration on tax revenue. Since the focus
here is not on cross-country di¤erences, but on the average relationship between tax
rates and tax revenue collections, we conne the analysis to the case where countries are
symmetric in all respects (1 = 2). Hence tax rates are identical and no prot-shifting
occurs in the Nash equilibrium. Using this in (6) and di¤erentiating with respect to 
gives
dR
d
= [+ (1  )(1  2t)] dt

d
+ t(1  ) d

d
; (11)
where the squared bracket in the rst term must be positive to ensure that a tax rise
increases revenues. Since the second term on the RHS of (11) is unambiguously positive
from (4) this immediately establishes:
Proposition 2 In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, a positive e¤ect of economic integra-
tion on the level of equilibrium tax rates is su¢ cient, but not necessary, for an increase
in tax revenue.
This result is easily explained. In our model economic integration simultaneously in-
creases the elasticity of the tax base and increases its size by raising the protability
of multinational rms. While both of these e¤ects determine the optimal adjustment
of taxes (which is thus ambiguous, even in a symmetric equilibrium) the increase in
the corporate tax base exerts a positive e¤ect on tax revenue even if tax rates stay
constant. Ignoring cross-country di¤erences and hence prot shifting in equilibrium
ensures that this tax base increase benets both countries simultaneously. Applied to
the empirical ndings in Table 1 this proposition shows that it is possible to simulta-
neously observe decreasing (e¤ective) corporation taxes and increasing corporate tax
revenues as economic integration proceeds.
4 Conclusion
This paper has started from two fundamental e¤ects that are associated with the rise
in foreign direct investment and multinational rm activity. In contrast to nationally
operating rms, multinationals have the opportunity to shift prots to low-tax coun-
tries, but they are also more protable and thus raise the aggregate protability in the
corporate sector. Incorporating these facts into a simple political economy model we
have shown that economic integration increases the e¢ ciency cost of capital taxation,
but it also increases the redistributive benets of the tax from the perspective of the
median voter. This result may help in explaining why several OECD countries have not
reduced their e¤ective rates of corporation tax since the 1980s. Moreover, our model
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implies that corporate tax revenues may rise despite falling tax rates, a nding that
is consistent with the experience of the majority of OECD countries during the last
decades.
It goes without saying that the model put forth in this paper is stylized in many
respects. In particular, core simplications have been the assumptions of exogenous
factor prices and productivity gains from a multinational operation, and the modelling
of the (personal and corporate) income tax system through a single, proportional tax
rate. We would argue, however, that the basic e¤ects outlined above would still be
present in a more complex model. At the same time we believe that incorporating a
more detailed modelling of multinational rms into the analysis of taxation and other
government policies is a promising area for further research.
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